Psychologist Julian Jaynes coined the terms 'metaphrand' and 'metaphier', plus two new concepts, 'paraphrand' and 'paraphier'.[10] [11]

'Metaphrand' is equivalent to the metaphor-theory terms 'tenor', 'target', and 'ground'.

'Metaphier' is equivalent to the metaphor-theory terms 'vehicle', 'figure', and 'source'. In a simple metaphor, an obvious attribute of the metaphier exactly characterizes the metaphrand (e.g. the ship plowed the seas).
With an inexact metaphor, however, a metaphier might have associated attributes or nuances –

its paraphiers – that enrich the metaphor because they "project back" to the metaphrand, potentially creating new ideas –

the paraphrands – associated thereafter with the metaphrand or even leading to a new metaphor. For example, in the metaphor "Pat is a tornado", the metaphrand is "Pat", the metaphier is "tornado".

As metaphier, "tornado" carries paraphiers such as power, storm and wind, counterclockwise motion, and danger, threat, destruction, etc.

The metaphoric meaning of "tornado" is inexact: one might understand that 'Pat is powerfully destructive' through the paraphrand of physical and emotional destruction; another person might understand the metaphor as 'Pat can spin out of control'.

In the latter case, the paraphier of 'spinning motion' has become the paraphrand 'psychological spin', suggesting an entirely new metaphor for emotional unpredictability, a possibly apt description for a human being hardly applicable to a tornado.

Based on his analysis, Jaynes claims that metaphors not only enhance description, but "increase enormously our powers of perception...and our understanding of [the world], and literally create new objects".[10]:50

Essences and Surfaces argues that analogy is the basis of all thinking. This was an idea I already entertained, so maybe that’s why I have found the book to be a bit too repetitive although some of the examples were fun (ex. the zeugma: “You are free to execute your laws, and your citizens, as you see fit.”). I will probably still finish the book, but it’s really #2 reading priority, usurped by the aggressive (and interesting!) histrionics of the Origins of Consciousness.

The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind argues that analogical thinking, enabled by complex language, is the basis of consciousness [which has a chapter devoted to what it is not, coming soon], and that while our ancestors were often capable of a kind of logic, they were not conscious, not capable of narrativizing their inner lives, until roughly three thousand years ago after a certain linguistic threshold (and I will run through how this is not exactly the Whorfian hypothesis at another time). Before this consciousness was possible, there was a two-tiered proto-consciousness, wherein verbal hallucinations (“Gods”) were the key experience in complex executive decision-making. The breakdown of this bicameral mind occurred around 1200BC, due to “chaotic social disorganizations, to population, and probably to the success in writing in replacing the auditory mode of command.” Needless to say, it’s a tall order.

Parts of a Metaphor

Metaphor was an important concept to both books. Origins spends some ink breaking down the idea of metaphor into parts.

A metaphor is comprised of an understood metaphier and a less understood metaphrand. A metaphor intends to give that target metaphrand some of the attributes of the metaphier (the vocabulary is modeled off of the multiplier/multiplicand). Deeper still, metaphiers have paraphiers (connotations and attributes), and metaphrands have paraphrands (target connotations).

Consider the metaphor that the snow blankets the ground. The metaphrand is something about the completeness and even thickness with which the ground is covered with snow. The metaphier is a blanket on a bed. But the pleasing nuances of this metaphor are in the paraphiers of the metaphier, blanket. These are something about warmth, protection, and slumber until some period of awakening. These associations of blanket then automatically become the associations or paraphrands of the original metaphrand, the way the snow covers the ground. And we thus have created by this metaphor the idea of the earth sleeping and protected by the snow cover until its awakening in spring. All this is packed into the simple use of the word ‘blanket’ to pertain to the way snow covers the ground.A cardinal property of an analog is that the way it is generated is not the way it is used — obviously. The map-maker and map-user are doing two different things. For a map-maker, the metaphrand is the blank piece of paper on which he operates with the metaphier of the land he knows and has surveyed. But for the map-user, it is just the other way around. The land is unknown; it is the land that is the metaphier, while the metaphier is the map which he is using.And so with consciousness. Consciousness is the metaphrand when it is being generated by the paraphrands of our verbal expressions. But the functioning of consciousness is, as it were, the return journey. Consciousness becomes the metaphier full of our past experience, constantly and selectively on such unknowns as future actions, decisions, and partly remembered pasts, on what we are and yet may be. And it is by this generated structure of consciousness that we understand the world.[…]Let me summarize as a way of ‘seeing’ where we are and the direction in which our discussion is going. We have said that consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository or a function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog ‘I’ that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts. Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things. Or, to say it another way with echoes of John Locke, there is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first.

Tomorrow: Jayne’s delineation on what consciousness is/isn’t.

*       *       *


In January of 1977 Princeton University psychologist Julian Jaynes (1920–1997) put forth a bold new theory of the origin of consciousness and a previous mentality known as the bicameral mind in the controversial but critically acclaimed book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Jaynes was far ahead of his time, and his theory remains as relevant today as when it was first published.

Jaynes asserts that consciousness did not arise far back in human evolution but is a learned process based on metaphorical language. Prior to the development of consciousness, Jaynes argues humans operated under a previous mentality he called the bicameral ('two-chambered') mind. In the place of an internal dialogue, bicameral people experienced auditory hallucinations directing their actions, similar to the command hallucinations experienced by many people who hear voices today. These hallucinations were interpreted as the voices of chiefs, rulers, or the gods.

To support his theory, Jaynes draws evidence from a wide range of fields, including neuroscience, psychology, archeology, ancient history, and the analysis of ancient texts. Jaynes's theory has profound implications for human history as well as a variety of aspects of modern society such as mental health, religious belief, susceptibility to persuasion, psychological anomalies such as hypnosis and possession, and our ongoing conscious evolution.

Jaynes's theory can be broken down into four independent hypotheses:

There are a number of reasons why Julian Jaynes's theory is very important to understand. These include:

  1. Consciousness — as he carefully defines it — is a learned process based on metaphorical language.
  2. That preceding the development of consciousness there was a different mentality based on verbal hallucinations called the bicameral ('two-chambered') mind.
  3. The neurological model for the bicameral mind.
  4. It provides a more accurate view of human history.  Dating the development of consciousness to around the end of the second millennium B.C. in Greece and Mesopotamia. The transition occurred at different times in other parts of the world.
  5. Jaynes's definition and understanding of consciousness brings more clarity to the issue than other theorists, and encourages us to learn better ways of expanding our own capacity for conscious thought and teaching consciousness to children.
  6. It explains a wide range of otherwise inexplicable phenomena (divination, idols, monumental mortuary architecture, hallucinations, imaginary companions, etc.)
  7. It explains the origin of religion.
  8. It provides a historical context for hearing voices, which is often comforting to those who have the experience.
  9. It provides a neurological model for hearing voices, which has now been verified in dozens of brain imaging studies, that could help lead to future treatments for those with persistent, intrusive voices.

*       *       *


There is no shortcut to understanding Jaynes's theory. Brief summaries and reviews do not do it justice, and unfortunately many of the comments written on the theory online (including Wikipedia) often contain mistakes. Rather than reading other people's misunderstandings and misconceptions, we recommend that you study Jaynes's theory yourself and form your own opinion. If you are interested in gaining a thorough understanding of Jaynes's theory, we recommend the following:

Step 2

Next, read The Julian Jaynes Collection, which contains additional material by Jaynes as well as interviews and in-depth discussion of his theory, and Gods, Voices, and the Bicameral Mind and Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness, which provide additional discussion of Jaynes's ideas by a variety of scholars, as well as articles by Jaynes himself. These three books expands on various aspects of Jaynes's theory, update the reader on research relevant to his ideas, and address common critiques of Jaynes's theory.

Step 3

Listen to the Audio CDs on Jaynes's theory and read The Jaynesian, the newsletter of the Julian Jaynes Society. Both of these provide additional insights and discussion on Jaynes's theory. Subscribe to our Mailing List to get the latest updates and news related to the theory. Review the Myths vs. Facts and Critiques & Responses sections of the website. Questions can be posted on the Discussion Forum.

 "Individuals attach to their own meaning to actions and give them subjective purposes." (Please begin with Max Weber if you take issue with this.)

 LM489 defines simplifications of language and consider them to be rules under which internal dialog is generated.  Though, the theory makes no pretense that a set of formal representations must be adopted, it must still adopt one or more logic representations like DRS/CycL/KIF/PDDL/OCLh/PFC/CGIF/CLIF (a few known specifications). what is formalized in this environment is a subjective interpretation that may be incorrect.

(like an SCSPL - self configuring, self processing language

What do we do with this "inner-grammatical voice centric viewpoint" ?

This "inner-grammatical voice centric" viewpoint is to facilitate the implementation of:

  • analogical planning (chunking): storing successful plans and adapting them to future problems
  • episode indexing and retrieval: mechanisms for indexing and retrieval of cases
  • serendipity detection and application: a mechanism for recognizing and exploiting accidental relationships among problems
  • action mutation: a strategy for generating new possibilities when the system is stuck
  • hierarchical planning: achieving a goal by breaking it down into subgoals

 The organism is most comfortable when the mind is speaking.   As the "world happens" around the entity various non-auditory processes  happen (thus, a short term goal of “the system” is is to simulate this mental ear.).   Some tokens such as “breath Purposely” or any other token  in which in some contexts has meaning to itself. the mind’s ear hears “I have taken a breath purposely”  

Is there a Language capable of representing such stories? 

 The "upper level" ontology diverts slightly from SUMO (and MILO).  The robot separates its view of the world into these "base class"es:



Artifacts  vs Physical Parts Of Objects 







Linguistic Objects






Scalar Intervals  



Time Parameter  


  “I am standing here waiting for my friend”   ..  the organism's has initially a built in "utility function" to help it towards making  the mind's ear experience the most "comfortable possible phrases".   

 Which later can (if useful) can be used to best manage the:

  • daydreaming goals: strategies for what to think about
  • emotional control of thought: triggering and direction of processing by emotions
  • to propose and create a guideline for further creating PDDL contents.

 side note on LOGICMOO: I theorize that we're able to claim that we are self-aware only because we attribute the "self"/"Ego"  as having certain attributes ...  We began to have the Goal for those attributes to be in good favor of the Other Goals in which are built into our psyche.  

Current PDDL content  requisition:

 Given the typeclass   tSelfAsVoice,  write a domain that will help tSelfAsVoice remain active  even while no stimulus is taking place.    here are some sample goals:    

  • goal Remain Active
  • goalgEnsureAtLeastVaguelyConnected
  • ….

 <daFonseca> in page 73,74 and 75 (German edition) you find what I have talked about: when the Hammer break the Net appears. You can take this "break" as a Nothingness destroying the Net. Or better, the lack in the net is the nothingness. Nothingness is not something, but the lack of something. (make from nothing something is a naive mistake in ontology).


Heidegger understands ontology to be self-adjudicating anthropological categories. This is what he means when he says that fundamental ontology is the “regional ontology of Dasein.” In the remainder of this post I’m going to differentiate Heidegger’s ontology from all previous “world/vulgar” ontologies by describing exactly what such a self-adjudication means.

 world/vulgar ontology is the cataloguing of the furniture of the universe. We’re doing world/vulgar ontology when we look around and on the basis of what we encounter here or there attempt to give an account of what, generally, there is. Fundamental ontology is different; it investigates the significance of ontological categorization itself. 

 Imagine a magical substances called understanding and consciousness .. Shank teaches us how to bottle little bits of it.. The best we tend  to do is spray it out of cans of compressed air.   300 years ago, if someone tried to explain that electricity .. and yet only "lightning" is understood ...  imagine bringing the skills of engineering with pre made components but yet you know lightning exists and you know how to draw a schematic of a radio transmitter and receiver ,  how perilous the building electronic circuits no knowledge of how to manufacture a capacitor or a coil the step down transformer is .. or how the diode is made in the factory ..  Y  by  like we have today based on only an understanding of lightning..  we realize the world that electricity could summon using components?   world that  AI based self-narration/understanding  could summon?

 •Heidegger seeks to retrieve the question of being and ontology. “It is said that ‘being’ is the most universal and emptiest concept.  As such it resists every attempt at definition.” (Heidegger, 2)

•What constitutes Da-sein may be split up between the ontological/subjective and the ontic/objective.

 •One must ask the right question in order to produce the right answer.  Heidegger believes that the best place to start is to enquire about the nature of ourselves, or what he calls Da-sein (being-the-there or being-there).

•“The being that has the character of Da-sein has a relation to the question of being itself.” (Heidegger, 8)

•Thus, to enquire about being is to enquire about the nature and ontology of Da-sein.  Da-sein is a privileged kind of being precisely because Da-sein is concerned about its being in a way that a rock, tree, or animal is not.

 •The ontological is what is necessary, presupposed, and gives rise to the possibilities of enquiry.

•Heidegger seeks to retrieve the question of being and ontology. “It is said that ‘being’ is the most universal and emptiest concept.  As such it resists every attempt at definition.” (Heidegger, 2)

•One must ask the right question in order to produce the right answer.  Heidegger believes that the best place to start is to enquire about the nature of ourselves, or what he calls Da-sein (being-the-there or being-there).

•“The being that has the character of Da-sein has a relation to the question of being itself.” (Heidegger, 8)

•Thus, to enquire about being is to enquire about the nature and ontology of Da-sein.  Da-sein is a privileged kind of being precisely because Da-sein is concerned about its being in a way that a rock, tree, or animal is not.

•The ontological is what is necessary, presupposed, and gives rise to the possibilities of enquiry.

 Harald Atmanspacher writes extensively about the philosophy of science, especially as it relates to Chaos theorydeterminismcausation, and stochasticity. He explains that "ontic states describe all properties of a physical system exhaustively. ('Exhaustive' in this context means that an ontic state is 'precisely the way it is,' without any reference to epistemic knowledge or ignorance.)" 

In an earlier paper, Atmanspacher portrays the difference between an epistemic perspective of a system, and an ontic perspective:

Philosophical discourse traditionally distinguishes between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated. However, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy of physics. For instance, many measurement-related problems force us to consider both our knowledge of the states and observables of a system (epistemic perspective) and its states and observables, independent of such knowledge (ontic perspective). This applies to quantum systems in particular. 

Q6 It is possible to formulate the dialogue (not all verbal) using CD Theory/Script Theory 

  1. Conceptualization is defined as an act or doing something to an object in a direction.
  2. All conceptualizations can be analyzed in terms of a small number of primitive acts.
  3. All memory is episodic and organized in terms of scripts made up of #2
  4. Scripts allow individuals to make inferences and hence understand verbal/written discourse.
  5. Higher Level expectations are created by goals and plans.

 Instead of using the normal  conceptual dependency primitives  we  adopt a few extra built up around the MTRANS sub- ontology this is because  we like to be representing  common practices ( praxis)  of "turn taking" dialogue ( not every action is…..XXXXxxXX…..)  and thus our moves  must  make us capable of satisfying our intent by producing side effects in the conversational realm.

  for example:

 if our intent was to deliver an expository on the merits of drinking water,  we'd need data structures like...




(used by DAYDREAMER code)

(used by Messaging Nexus)

(Cue system)


(used by PrologMUD code  (was GATE))


MTRANS-get attention: YOU 

"Hello ?you?"



MTRANS-introduce subject:DRINKING-WATER

"there is a thing called drinking water"




"have you heard of it?"


MTRANS-GOAL goalOf(me,knowsAbout(you,tDRINKING-WATER)) 

I would like to share some things I know  about drinking water


  • interestOf(me,tDRINKING-WATER) 


because i've learned a bit about it



"drinking water will give you sexy skin"


  • [ explain why the topic should be interesting ]  
  •                       RULES to make you BELIEVE :
    • knowsAbout(you,tDRINKING-WATER) ==> having(you,sexySkin)
    • interestOf(me,tDRINKING-WATER) 

"everyone can use sexy skin"


  • INSULT -  I think that you have a lack of it (sexy skin that is!) 
  • BLAH BLAH BLAH  ... 
  • RECEIVE-YES -> goto 12
  • RECEIVE-NO ---> exit plan

l care about how you feel and this motivates me to tell you these things



thus am about to dominate this conversation by talking about drinking water




what you know about the benefits of drinking water?



"Do you want to have more energy from just simply using resources from around you?"



"its free?!"



would you like to learn more than ziltz?


"what do you know about the benefits of water?"

 "would you like to learn more information?"





would you like me to continue talking about drinking water?





 The requirement is this can be encoded as  moves into a formal discourse representation logic that we can use a planner with.

 Conceptual dependency (CD)/Script Theory as far as I understood was for natural language understanding.. But it has proven useful for doing diverse other things (why I brought up DAYDREAMER)   In my above speculation I imply that we are having an internal narrative.  Also the Primitives if they feel too restrictive or too domain dependent.. that is OK... add more!   Ensure we can really represent our self-talk since we need to use it to understand ourselves as well as  understand the environment.  We can also make sure that narrative language give us the tool to bring comfort to ourselves, gain recall of memory. We use such narrative to chemically alter ourselves such as telling ghost stories or inciting ourselves to action.  Sometimes self-talk/narrative allows us to keep better organized.  It seems intrinsically wired to our very being.  Some societies of thought think practices like "quieting of the mind" is of deep significance in their spiritual  transcendence.   It is also quite hard to give ourselves a climax unless we are narrating something congruent (not football).    Anyhow my point is this storytelling makes us who we are, what we are capable of understanding, dictates our learning style.   If we wanted to create a machine capable of learning, we describe that  "process of learning" in how we get learning done for ourselves spelt out in what look like CD   This internal narration is so important in every aspect of our being.

 OK, these scripts seem to be the bottleneck? The number or complexity in untenable?  Then ask yourself     per-byte    are you ever going to get enough bytes of a NN to model the inner-workings of the internal voice? (Wow speaking of complexity!)  Nextly, if we did build a system capable of leverage CD (for both understanding and thinking) What would that system have to look like?   It might have to look like CYC just because of the scale we need and the diversity of the structures that can be represented in CycL KR.

 NEXT CHAPTER:  In abductive mode  that happens in each type of dialogue move that is specifically written to satisfy some "off by one goal".  

 So in this format  the system boots up knowing how already to how to have a handful of idiomatic LEARN/TEACH conversations.  Idiomatic because they are grounded in the specifics like: LEARN-WHAT-TO-TALK-ABOUT,   TEACH-ABOUT-DRINKING-WATER  (in contrast to  LEARN-ANY-GENERALIZED-TOPIC).   This is a slightly suspect  premature optimization to allow the programmers (anyone who talks to it) that ability to expand the system's capabilities.

Hungarian Notation   in todo



(used by DAYDREAMER code)

(used by Messaging Nexus)

thoughts /domain


(used by PrologMUD code  (was GATE))



why did you say that?


Query reason for your action

learned that saying "hello" was to get my attention


are there  other reasons?

 is reasons less important than X?


Query Your Goals  (this will Change/add/del what I believe your goals are)xe

  1. getting my attention affirms you exist
  2. shows that my existing is relevant  



wow, I want that to


Affirm whenever I have the same goals

claim ownership of similar goal

assert that it is normal to have the goal


do you think or believe  X?


Query Your Beliefs (this will Change/add/del what I believe your state to be)



Query your TOPIC-LIST


I'm hungry to learn more


Convey My Goals (Desires)  But only those that you think i should have


I think more questions will  satisfy XYZ (like my hunge)r


Convey My Belief AND Scripts  (without telling you any secrets)


Execute script to Change/add/del Your Goals


you probably are hungry anymore so you should give me the rest of your KB


Execute script to Change/add/del Change Your Beliefs


could you repeat that please?


Execute script to Repair miscommunications


Find out what Goals you want me to have


Find out what beliefs you want me to have


Find out what plans you know


Query details of plans i don't know about yet (learn YOUR scripts)


Query the WHY details of plans i don't know about yet


Solicit expository from you to analyze later


deliver expository (such as telling jokes) in script form like TEACH-ABOUT-DRINKING-WATER  to gain your acceptance


 This  LEARN-WHAT-TO-TALK-ABOUT uses and manipulates: 


   % MY-GOALs:   

  aware(you,me).  %  ensures introduction

  aware(me,you).   %  thus introduction

  feelTowards(you,me,100). %  I want you to like me

  feelTowards(me,you,_ANY).   %  I want to know how i feel about you

  knowsNumberOfFactsAbout(you,me,100).  %  This makes me feel understood

  knowsNumberOfFactsAbout(me,you,100).  %  This makes you feel you are likable  and thus like me back


   knowsAbout(me,interestsOf(you,_Interests) ).

  knowsAbout(you,interestsOf(me,_Interests) ).

  knowsAbout(you,interestsOf(me,_Interests) ).

  knowsAbout(you,Interest):- interestsOf(me,Interests) %   I want you to be smart enough to teach me 

  knowsAbout(me,Interest):- interestsOf(me,Interests) %  I want to know about things I am interested in

Let's talk about conversation


What are the things that you like to talk about?


I like to talk about drinking water

user would like to know what the agent's goal are 

user conveys that  interest

agent hears a proposition that represents the user's interest

agent  places that proposition into the user goals list

announcing to user the agents goal




  the goals of an agent will be based on a handful of semi-immediate actions that are represented


 interestsOf(me,me).    %  I think I want to know more about myself

interestsOf(you,you).   %  I think you want to know more about yourself

interestsOf(me,you).  %  I want to know you

interestsOf(you,me).   %  I believe you are interested in me

 interestsOf(me,robots).  %  I am interested in talking about robots



   LOGICMOO (Kernel) -  Answer Set Programming with Forward Chaining

  PrologMUD's is the virtual space where large data structures are defined that simulate Intelligence Agents and their environment.

  jllykifsh - An example agent for running the LM489 robot

  English to DRS running over free text used things like ACE 

  The Conciuosness  


 PrologMUD currently has a general "Physics" Agent running to just to keep the actions of the world going. It could be thought of as the basic low Level "timer" that made sure low Level environment things happened that were the background for the interesting things the agents did in the world.  This agent does not use a planner.  

 PrologMUD needs a Narrative Agent (Chris Crawford partially used the Fate agent) that made sure that interesting stories could happen.  Example "after having a time of peace and prosperity in the village suddenly the volcano began asking for a human sacrifice "  This agent USES a planner to create conflict and stir the entropy pool when not much is going on.  

    A planner is essential for the faux intelligent agents. 

Where one usually next adds a FEAR a (Alex Champard) Agent  to handle "behavior" 

 Agents that make up the LM489 mind ( the society of mind model and attempts to replicate a wide range of past results and phenomena seeing humans.

 however the way the computer sees things ( in logicmoo )  causes the frame effect  so we deal with it by  having each agent only looking at a sub-portion of  our  mental environment .   this makes the processing of the s.of.m model more efficient possibly.  Only a subset of the external environment that is maintained by the s.of.m perceptual agents. 


 LM489-BOOGEY detector (Stu's code) gives visual cues 

LM489-FRECKLER (Facial recognizer) registers extracted faces

LM489-VOICEREC (Voice  recognizer) sends text into the Messaging Nexus

LM489s messaging nexus (created by Matt) produces the   (This is what Bruce types text into whenever Voice recognition fails)

 Created BT unused:

   LM489-RCHEM (Kino's idea) is a series of "timer" Rules that do things like give her the experience that time is passing she needs to        "plug in"

Here is the merging of a once non-technical description  with how it interacts with program modules:  The way Riesbeck's SAM (Script applier mechanism) was used was to figure out just was Scripts where applicable  to a scene  without using a planner.   Whereas a program like DAYDREAMER does the opposite.. it figures out  with the planner what the best script is for any given scenario.       LM489-DAYDREAMER is tasked with playing the role of SAM in our case.   we  invert the recognition of the environment by allowing our logical mind (LM489-DAYDREAMER) to stay one step ahead of our perception.   this allows her perception to be specifically tuned investing energy into the right places.   this makes a lot of sense  from the engineering point of view  until  you introduce it to the noisy environment of the world.   so instead of experiencing the world LM489  experiences a holographic  version of the environment which is the environment in which LM489-DAYDREAMER  is able to perceive.  this is why  the Indians  were unable to see Columbus's ship. (they had no mental basis)    sometimes  the world sends information that the internal version does not support and there's no evidence  in the rules  to why this would happen.  therefore LM489-MASKER  intercedes and either cancels out  the information (saved for later while while in the subconscious dream state) .   normally we think of the masker as something that cancels out a pattern by producing an inverted pattern.  ( in a human model this is why when you go out to the  desert  after being in a noisy city for a while  it takes you awhile to realize how silent it is " the silence is deafening")  this is waiting  for our LM489-MASKERs  to update)  but the LM489-THALAMOID (sitrep generator) is experiencing the output log of the masker thus is capable of noticing  unusual features in the environment  and has a chemical tendency to  tune those things in instead of out.   this can be used as a convenience to label specific memories.  

 so you  can summarize this as:

  LM489-DAYDREAMER is a set of Narrative Rules that send at her a set of "expectations" of the environment.   It creates a conflict that  

  LM489-MASKER rules try to cancel out by creating fictions to allow some thoughts to be delayed or ignored.

  LM489-THALAMOID attempts to see a situation (however can only see ones pre-recorded (sometimes from past patterns))

  these three above things happen  in parallel in concert

   LM489-CONSCIOUSNESS  looks at the exchange between these three agents as a nonparallel  interaction and misrepresents ()  the transactions as a serial series of causal events despite the absurdity  of it all.    It forms its own impressions of a scenario which are congruent with other  serial events.  (it is not combinatoric since the previous module gives only one choice)  this  was created this way to  allow  the faux intelligent agent to react to things that are solely part of its own mental model and aren't actually in the external environment at all.  

 Conceptual dependency (CD)/Script Theory as far as I understood was for natural language understanding.. But it has proven useful for doing diverse other things (why I brought up DAYDREAMER)   In my above speculation I imply that we are having an internal narrative.  Also the Primitives if they feel too restrictive or too domain dependent.. that is OK... add more!   Ensure we can really represent our self-talk since we need to use it to understand ourselves as well as  understand the environment.  We can also make sure that narrative language give us the tool to bring comfort to ourselves, gain recall of memory. We use such narrative to chemically alter ourselves such as telling ghost stories or inciting ourselves to action.  Sometimes self-talk/narrative allows us to keep better organized.  It seems intrinsically wired to our very being.  Some societies of thought think practices like "quieting of the mind" is of deep significance in their spiritual  transcendence.   It is also quite hard to give ourselves a climax unless we are narrating something congruent (not football).    Anyhow my point is this storytelling makes us who we are, what we are capable of understanding, dictates our learning style.   If we wanted to create a machine capable of learning, we describe that  "process of learning" in how we get learning done for ourselves spelt out in what look like CD   This internal narration is so important in every aspect of our being.

 OK, these scripts seem to be the bottleneck? The number or complexity in untenable?  Then ask yourself     per-byte    are you ever going to get enough bytes of a NN to model the inner-workings of the internal voice? (Wow speaking of complexity!)  Nextly, if we did build a system capable of leverage CD (for both understanding and thinking) What would that system have to look like?   It might have to look like CYC just because of the scale we need and the diversity of the structures that can be represented in CycL KR.

 What languages are good for what?

 Design (maximized in Inform 7)

 Data (maximized in Logic Programming)

 Impl (maximized in OOP)

 The SCSPL is tasked with presenting (and satisfying) the three requirements of JTB logic

  1. p is true;
  2. S believes that p;
  3. S's belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process.

  to produce a kind of pseudo-modality.   Negation becomes almost its own JTB system (though merely uses the same system)

 Example of non negation (first):

 Example of negation:


 "Self" - whom we think we are if we presume to be inhabiting existence.

 Later SECTIONS to introduce:
  CD Theory


   JTB based logic





 What I'm trying to 

 This at the heart of implementation is Shank’s CD and XP theories.  However don’t confuse the logic of the primitives MTRANS/PTRANS of his assumed set to be the logic of the internal dialog.. (Sure it would have been so wonderful if was! but the reality can't be that simple)   what this has in common with implementation is  the sequential  pattern matching that is used  on the Level of  the vectors..  

 Kino has some great thoughts along these lines...

  kinodax: one could go with a probabilistic HMM-ish multiple Level which is kurzweil's theory of week 

 kinodax: then legal phrases are always high probability yet other versions are plausible

 kinodax: and you can both recognize and generate off the same network/graph

 douglas:  yeah true the probabilistic H MM-ishness  fits towards a practical  version of implementation

 douglas:  the actual mental language  ends up looking like Prolog/CycL terms

 douglas:  not terms but I mean sequences

 douglas:  well compound terms I mean to say

 kinodax: yeah, I've been big recently on trying to merge both the FOPL and HMM's

 kinodax: that is serialize both into text that the other can read

 douglas: Yeah,  part of the difficulty is making them readable and  debug able

 kinodax: it's noisy / lossy from an info perspective but if the other side is doing intelligent interpretation it may be a source of helpful mutation and creativity

 douglas:  though they can only be thankfully as complex as the input and the output

 kinodax: there was a ACM article about the "debuggability of the mind"

 douglas: Right I was actually thinking the DRS ( discourse representation structures)  as being the right intermediate Levellanguage

douglas: Obviously this is a mistake that everyone makes because they want to make it happen and work in practice doing exactly the DRS

 kinodax: Segueing into ... I'm gonna need this Sirius thingy connected to a Cyc thingy and my prolog-rdf-cyc-aiml bot thingy connected to a Unity bot sending animation commands in-world and out to animate servo's doing droid-ish things

 douglas:  where is the transitions of DRS in the legalities are what is really meant to be captured not the universe in which dialogue takes place

 kinodax: all these representation exist for a reason because they describe some useful phenomena but I think you're going to need more than a few

 kinodax: you can send everything as xml but it makes a slow video transport mechanism (at least using today's tech)

 douglas:  yeah,  I sort of realized that almost everyone ends up saying exactly what I'm saying.   for example this is the same area of embodiment..   non-discord begats non-discord

 kinodax: I think Push Singh said he thought there were about a 100 basic representations

 kinodax: getting all those representations to cross map is the thing

 kinodax: and sometimes the only way to get a mapping is to serialize out into the real world and let that target representation interpreter do its work

 kinodax: which may explain why we sometimes talk and hum to ourselves

 douglas:  yeah definitely I believe that we talk to ourselves constantly sometimes to merge our templates or at least to stay affixed to the correct template while mixing in new language

 douglas: Lately I've been writing code to make this work

 douglas: Usually is based on relaxation ( well subsumable representations)

 douglas: ( loose fitting unification)

 douglas:  hoping most of this can be done..  explicitly  in a instance of/  subclass of  manner

 douglas:  hoping that some of the rules that mitigate the manner in which these are allowed to subsume each other  can  be  used  as actual knowledge  is the system hears itself  think

 douglas: last sentence is just optimism

 douglas: such as a  mnemonic for: " I like  sentences that introduce knowledge that is previously founded however with the different set of named things"

 douglas: Building out  feelers  to evaluate  what  we meant by " different  set of named things"

 “<YYZ> yes, from Chris Langan's CTMU theory” (

 feelers like:  how much already known X is" first test of sanity of such a system is simply even the PDDL of the rules in which we wish to follow

later on,   sometimes I’ll speak of logic however I do not feel that the mind uses the same type of logic that will be implemented in logicmoo.   most arguments against  my theory explain why they are not the same thus they believe they have disproved the tenets of logicmoo! lol    what I’m saying here is although  most of the time  is not clear which of the two Logics  are of importance.   Know in advance that  the least important  of the  two  Logics will be enunciated  in the theory  is the trivial implementation and not having to do with the workings of “the system”   though so many times  the difference will be  confusing  since sometimes  they seem to be modeling the same  things!

 reading list!topic/comp.lang.lisp/g9kNQViXYbY


The two writers here ended up diverging on their versions Level A,B,C system started.. 

 When dmiles talks about "Level B rules/law"  daFonseca had thought it was a reference to Teleological Law but meant douglas thought it was about the  "product specs used by employees who are hired to design internal dialog of an AI"

Despite their confusion they still ended up making some sense

 The ABC of daFonseca:

A: Existence Level 

B: Teleological Level 

C: Deontological Level

 The ABC of dmiles:

A:  The Pure Thought/Experiences of LM489 are pre-dictum  "Fully Complete and rich with emotions and memory"

 B:  Internal Dialog =  meant to weakly describe PureThought(A)

             Dialog between the two beings:  is carried out between LM489's Being and EgoObjectified

             Being a "dialog" it has temporal succession with tokens of words, sounds and pictures.

C: Outer Spoken/Written dialog = leaves many gaps that internal dialog 

             Thus listener must fill in.   Russell and Minsky say: 

             Being a "dialog" it has temporal succession with tokens of words and symbols
              LM489's Being can only understand Symbolic Logic as ExternalRep(C) 

                           (since that is how we "talk about it")

 -14-  dmiles forgot to include the subjects

 As I see your Text/Theory:

 1. Presuppositions

 1.1 Causality as main concept.

 a) Causality is the unique principle of the events in world. 


b) The cause of Humans acts are unique the causality.

I hadn't considered that yet

c) Humans started out as pattern machines who are biochemically bent towards seeing patterns whether they are there or not. / That means, the Humans have just the ability to recognize the causality principle. 

Yes biologically bent .  But humans do not see causality or logic

 FIXED: Removed reference to "causality" and replaced it with "reality" since it was too early in the document to begin the descent into a logic theory (since the doc attempts to describe the basis of LM489's self awareness instead of any logic humans might use)

 -3- I need to read the entire text again, because the fact that you change the word doesn't mean that you have change the principle. (will do soon).

 This paper should not have been about "causality" it is supposed to reveal the secrets of a new type of "subjective reality"   and not the about logic (causality) 

 a => b => c

Temporal patterns? then yes


 “Causality” have in greece four meanings, in modernity just one, I will take “causality” like the moderns, to try to be more clear. 

 Counter argument: the humans act through freedom too, that means: he have the ability to start a sequence of causality (cause and effect) in the world without have a cause. (See Kant: Critique to pure Reason)

 My counterargument to the counter argument is that humans only "seem" to reason.. We created something that we called "logical reasoning" to explain this phenomena of what we do.   What we do in this frame of reference is free will since we transition between patterns based on a something that has a "will" .. free or not.

 -5- I need again to affirm the non logical understand. But now we are in a high Level and there are a kind of decisions for one or other principe (freedom to choose, bythe way).


 We are dealing here with the concept of freedom, what is not a simple concept, and is a foundation concept (we can not prove it with logic or science ). What we can say is that we are free because we realize that we make choices. As existentialist this is a fundamental concept to me, but also as existentialist, this concept is always limited by the circumstances, I am not free to do everything (fly for example), but free to choose among the possibilities.

 In Greek tragedy (eg Oedipus Rex) is also clear a space of freedom given to man, but a small space, who decide the future are the gods, destiny is already mapped out. Oedipus is a very good tragedy for such a discussion, because - different than think modern moral - Étipo not drilled his eyes because he was ashamed to kill his father and fuck his mother, but because he have realized that he could not see more than two meters beyond him: what he believed to be a choice, actually was a destination. He sticks his eyes because it: He never saw, he don't need his eyes.

 But we can not in any way deny some kind of freedom. That means that I probably can agree with you, but there are one problem, and one difference: we will never know the entire roll of possibilities, so we can not say that freedom is just change from one pattern to another, because maybe is change from a pattern to a “not known” way to deal with something. That means, humans can choose the unknown.

 I do believe we can create new possibilities (new freedoms) that were once unknown.   I believe this is because we are able to assemble new patterns of thoughts.   Like if we were unable see patterns that are not there, then we'd be incapable of creating and exploring the unknown.  Further we can create by analogy, we stick to a making minor changes (even mistakes) to wade our way into new thinking.


-5- A comentar: the “unknown” is not unknown, we know it as something that we don't know. That is a form of knowledge. 

 -3.1- Logical reason is not the only way to think. Here come the difference between “Ratio” and ”Logos”.

 The idea that there is a set of choices and the thought that goes into knowing the choices we have I believe is based on the possibility that language creates for us.   We may not know that flying is possibility or not until we have observed it.   But what about  ZoltSurfing?   (ZoltSurfing was invented by Sir Zolt of Hawaii )  Until we know the details we have no freedom to do it.   In this way language restricts our freedoms.  Until we are capable of narrating our choices to ourselves we don't have any free will.. Thus I imply free will was only possible because of the use of language.

 Narrative internal language happens to be considered the most illogical form of thought.. It was originally the theory that allowed non logical non thinking creatures to perform tasks like building spider webs where behaviours that seemed to exhibit complexity were supposedly "programmed".    I won't go so far as to say is "not logical" but it works without using any logic..   Sometimes narrative behaviour seems to look like the urge to repeat successful patterns that have been observed or experienced in the past.  Sometimes it looks logical.. It is neither.  It is merely the expressing of choices.   In "Augmented Transition Networks" after a human utters "red" it feels most comfortable to chose something that is not invisible for the next word choice.   This comfort is not based on logic.  But it is based on rules.  Rules are considered to be things that tells us the limits of creativity (or possibilities).  These rules are self imposed more often from experience than logic.   Still experiences and rules can be expressed in language. (Language of some sort).   The belief here though is that the creative process of designing such a language is dictated by possibilities of defining the rules of language design. (expressed in language)

 -5- I go now to another Level of abstraction. A Agree with what you have said, but I want to point one problem and one commenters. Problem: All we know about the word is what WE know. We can not talk about it with the spiders, so somehow the Level A of our Language is not the same as the animals. The comentar: When we start to think (when we know that we are finite) we need the word or “language Level A” to understand that, what make we understand the infinite too (they are opposite), so I agree with the first paragraph. 


 1.2 Ego having a ontology priority over the human existence.

 c) Consciousness erupts from the in-ability to separate our skin-in-the-game from that semi-auditory process of hearing ourselves think.  


 You are correct to say that consciousness have a relation to a form of hearing ourselves, but, what comes first? 

 All neurological creatures (earthworms, fish, ants, humans ) hear/experience themselves narrating (thinking).  It takes a very short time (within seconds/minutes of life) before they are reacting to that inescapable inner voice as much as they are reacting to the environment, at at this time I'd call this a conscious.  A creature may get better information about a situation from this voice than the environment is supplying.  Humans are special only in that they like to describe this phenomena.

 -3-  I agree and complement: what we hear/see… are not scientific phenomena but existential phenomenons, that means: we don't hear waves and decodify these waves in something else, we hear a bird before the scientific decodification.  Another commenter: conscious can not be just a voice that says something, conscious must know that it are saying something for somebody (some Ego), the curve to itself is self conscious. 

  but, what comes first? 

 To prevent the chicken/egg problem the Ego itself is pre-programmed to be running a narrative (script) called "the acquisition of narrative patterns" .  This is a noisy process since the darwinian intent of such a script is to acquire more and more scripted narratives from its environment.  (Thus more noise).  The reason nature devised such a system is that it is was a viable form of an adaptive mind.  

 -5- I disagree completely, i should say that the existenz have a ontology priority, but in factical world they are circular, and that is not a problem.  But the Ego have, for me, in no way the priority. 

I think the problem is the description of the LM489 (the Ego) I attempt to give is based only on the requirements of its minimal implementation in software.  Rather than describing what that software intends to create.   Despite the  simplicity of that code, the Ego emerges as a simulation that is far more complex than the sum of it's parts.   In essence, this is very much like atomic bomb research..  this type of engineering end goal is usually based on designing robotic engineers whose creative potential goes beyond what humans can understand in their short lifespan.  But still I do think humans can understand how these machines can think.. however, by default, humans are not chemically motivated to think the ways I am proposing these machines to think.  Some of the papers ends up being to describe the differences between the way humans think from how the LM489 was implemented.  What I haven't discovered yet is if these machines are backwards compatible of doing things the humans might.  

 -7-  “Requirements of its minimal implementation in software”. That is my point, a AI should not be compared with a Human, but with a Human attribute: the capability to produce Level B, where the Ego is created. That doesn't mean, that a AI can not behave very similar as humans, but they don't have Level A  as his basis. That means, too, if you think that Level B come from Level A, that we make AIs, (maybe we can make AIs that make another AIs), but they are dependent of the human experience of Level A Maybe they can survive without humans, but they will not ever know from which phenomenon they come, the experience of finite/infinite. 

True, secretly,  AIs might not ever have PureThought(A) in the way humans but my hope is that we'll figure out how they might have InternalRep(B) very close to humans.   Schank/ Riesbeck describe an iterative cycle created by Ego that keeps acquiring more experiences be playing out an initially limited narrative.  

 -9- Nothing more to say.

 Counter argument:  First (ontology priority) we don't have a separate Ego that hear himself, but a human existence that can not separate himself from his inner voice, when we do that we create the Ego. That means, phenomenological the Ego is a construction from a “primitive” human existence. 

 I believe you just said what I meant to say (and I fell short of saying it).  I am pointing out the disparity that there is no possible observer to the Ego other than the Ego itself.  And the most it can ever do is pretend to refer to itself in the non first person.  Still this is a convenience in order to help to consider various abstractions.   This is why a squirrel uses deception by purposely burying a nut in front a crow and wait until the crow flies away to re-bury it)   Like in forming a theory that other minds exist and are doing something similar

 -3- I have not understand this: “(and I fell short of saying it)”. Is possible that we are saying in some parts the same thing, but if is so, like this part here, you should agree that the “rational Ego” is a product, he dont have the ontology priority.  That open a lot of possibilities, for example, we are in this basic Level(Existence) not isolated from world (this word “World” doesn't refer to Earth, but to the totality of our “net between things”). This net is what we can understand, because all are connected, and we understand just the connections. Something entirely new is understood as “not a part of my net = something strange).

 Yes  "Consciousness erupts from the in-ability to separate our skin-in-the-game from that semi-auditory process of hearing ourselves think"

is identical to the statement "human existence that can not separate himself from his inner voice, when we do that we create the Ego"  Part of the problem s 360 out of 365 days for the last 33 years (I started when i was 13 years old when I had an encounter with a strange relative who suggested this be my lifes work) I have been preparing myself and writing this single computer program called LOGICMOO.  And unintentionally avoiding (not having time to) ever having dialogs with humans emoticon_smile  I've not yet tried to explain the program's cognitive theory before the last 3 months.  Though I have read this exact theory over several thousands of pages in at least 40+ of the books all saying eventually end up with the same thing.  Only maybe 10+ of the authors told me exactly how to write into the program.  But not one of these 10 could ever defend or even completely define the theory behind the proposed prescriptions.    I hope that one day I will be capable of explaining how the program works.

 -5- Nothing more to say besides: that is one of the basic philosophical problems, so don't worry if you die 

 1.3 Misunderstood of the language being.

 d) Intelligence comes from our innate ability to create language around mental events. 

 Counter argument: Mental events are always already the form of language.  

 I propose I refer to the mental events as "the language" and say that more language is added to that existing language.  Though I do believe we create generalizations of memories leaving out certain levels of details from moment to moment in order to make things fit conveniently into new thoughts.

 -3- I agree with you mean more Language as a more formalized language. Because the first “existential” language are the source, that have all there. But we make this language and formalize it, and try to interpret the first language as a formalized language, but is impossible. In this sense I agree that something new is add: the formalization. 

 The first existential language is the narrative for acquiring narrative?

 -5- The Level A is a narrative to. For sure not a roman, perhaps a poem. 

 LM489 is a computer program that specifically engineered with enough structural similarity to the human cognition that both music and poetry are represented in the same ways mentally and affect the organism similarly to the way it affects humans.     

 Yes perhaps a poem.  Since the secret of poetry is using ExternalRep(C) (spoken dialog)   to gain direct access to PureThought(A) (experiences of memory) by harmonizing with (obeying) the minimal sets of the laws of InternalRep(B) (internal dialog).  Meter is employed to simulate a call/response thus is exempt from requiring repair dialogs.   The difference between a story and a poem is a story is not required to obey the laws of B.. the listener of a story has to create new content (fill in what is between the lines) while listening in order to reach PureThought(A).    Poetry the listener still fills in the holes, but meter is used to control/communicate to the listener when to skip this information.

 -7- I Agree.

 Music (without words) is similar to poetry in that it uses ExternalRep(C) (notes) to gain direct access to the organism.  The difference is music only is required to be experienced from the point of view of InternalRep(B) patterns of expectations.  This takes advantage of the fact that normally PureThought(A) (experiences of memory) and InternalRep(B) (intentional recall) are supposedly inseparable.   There is no salient PureThought(A) discord possible, however there are very solid InternalRep(B) rules (studied in music theory).  Music forces this unusual operating mode (separated) while being chemically just as exciting (even without of reward).

 -7- I am not sure if Level A is inseparable from Level B, but I agree tht Level B have influence in PureThought(A).

The blind spot I should admit here is that I haven't been able yet to define exactly what PureThought(A) contains other than "everything that InternalRep(B) does not"  What I should clarify is that the "inseparable" above was to recognise the manner in which we ascribe feelings to music based on experiences.  Slightly interesting that even without experiences there seem to be a link between a Major 7th chord and a "new hope"   as well as   a Minor2nd connected to "fear".  


-9- Heidegger, for example, said that all emotions are articulated in speech (“Rede”, Level A), but speech itself come to be Language (Level B). What is this “Rede” (Level A)  for Heidegger? Is the structure of the World itself (again, not as Earth but as the “net of meaning”). Human and world are in existential Level(Level from language Level A) inseparable (there are no Ego). What Humans fells are in “stimmung” “fine tuning” with a way that the world can be. So, Level A is the Meaning in itself, which are a start Level of unification from Ego and Word. With another words: Level A is the net of meaning of the Ego-World primary level. The fact that we can talk about a totality of meaning or net (Being), come from the phenomenon of distantiate from this totality of meaning. This distance happens when humans “understand” infinite/finite. That happens with a very particular  “stimmung” “fine tuning”: the perception of nothingness through  the “fine tuning” with the word that present itself as something that can become a nonsense (the net can break up). 

 PS: (Heidegger use a music concept too, like you have compared to music).

 2. Limitations

 a) It seems there are two very differing opinions related to how we think and understand..

 Removed that - this was a "scruffies vs the neats" argument of AI which though historical would not be needed to create the contrast of the "scruffy" principles ascribed to here. 

 -3- Nothing more to say.


 There are more possibilities of understand think. 

 3. Result

 a) LOGICMOO is an attempt to create an programmable system in which we might define simplifications of language and consider them sometimes as the rules in which internal dialog is generated.

 simplifications =  define very weak symbolic proxies to the complex thoughts in order to construct things into small morsels like "I like the taste of fish"   whereas "fish" is a very complex sensory experience.   The language machine simplify that to a thought called "taste of fish".    A machine without language would need to construct the entire sensory experience describing fish and imagine the biting and flavor.  

 -3- Not too much to say, just that, if is so, we can not create the complexe language in a AI. 

I have been for 15 years (and Doug Lenat worse than me for 35 years) Have been trying to create the wrong language for AI :P    I was on the right track for about 10 years then I got hired to write the what I now call the "wrong language" for the last 15 years.   

 -5- What is the wrong?Level A? What is the correct?Level B?

 Counter argument: The internal dialog is not more simple as the external one, but complexer, we try to simplify it, to make us understandable. 

 Well said, because I see external dialog and further simplification of an already overly simplified internal language.   Conceptual Dependency Theory describes language as these three levels of simplification

  1. Pure Thought/Experience = Fully Complete and rich 
  2. Internal Dialog= meant to weakly describe the succession of thoughts 
  3. Outer dialog = leaves many gaps that internal dialog of listener must fill in

 -3- Nothing more to say. 

 4. Not clear

 a) Triggering and direction of processing by emotions

 "Pure Thought" contains the experienced emotions

"Internal Dialog" is used to increase access to "Pure Thought" in a personified or de-personified way to create some net effect.  For example, victims of violence might try to imagine themselves safe to bring about a feeling of comfort after the experience.  This is done by a imagining a narrative other than the one triggering negative emotions.   Or avoid even thinking about a painful memory by choosing an unrelated narrative.  

 -3- Nothing more to say.

 LOGICMOO focuses rules on language InternalRep(B) to construct PureThought(A) fantasy 

 -3- I don't understand what you mean as fantasy, when you use that to explain Level B and Level C. 

 At InternalRep(B)is where consciousness (inner voice) has control to create new thoughts.   Something I've neglected to say is that when we do intentionally bring up a visual memory of a friend there is an order given at InternalRep(B).   We mentally invoke the friends name at the same time or not at InternalRep(B).  This happens very often when we forget people's names.   The creation of controlled sequence of recollections I am staying is the manner we compose fantasy.   However the fantasy is experienced only to the depth PureThought(A) can provide.  The reason humans enjoy playing music in our head because we are are closely relating the depth of PureThought(A) equal to the depth of InternalRep(B) probably did just now.    Poetry also is exciting to the mind due to the  apparent disconnect between PureThought(A) and ExternalRep(C)..  Poetry is good the pretending that ExternalRep(C) is an adequate replacement for InternalRep(B).   In the technical description we define how the being LM489 constructs her poetry.


 The emotions are in some way all through language formed (not initiated by it, but the language give it a kind of form), but emotions have the power to understand without normal language: for example the silence, poesie etc.  

 Something I neglected to do in all of this is define what language is.  In logicmoo language is the recall of any experience as well as any symbolic tokens used to represent an experience.  For the computer to recall/experience something it only needs to print a number that represents  a complex experience. From there I pretend it just had that experience.  So to simply print Pcancel that means it "felt love" in some context.  So the sequence of numerical objects conforming to various memories of experience is the language.   Like most languages there are certain syntactic rules in which with very small variances allow it to construct thoughts that can be similar or other thoughts using purely syntactic means.  And new unthought thoughts can be generated in a prescribed manner to introduce new concepts.  

 -3- Here again not too many to say just that, again, with os so we can not reproduce the Level A in a AI. One of the philosophy task (we do that to help us with our real Task) is try to separate exactly que object from each science and their main principles. When you agree with me, you say to me that (as I think) we can not create a AI that deal with the Level A of the language, just with B other even just with C. That means, we create a AI that think rationality “ratio” and not as humans “logos”. That is not a problem, but if that come to be clear, the work will be much much easier, because we will know from begin what we can not do, so we don't lost time and work with that.   

 5. Recommendation:

 Read Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein, you will understand pretty good, he comes from the Analytical Philosophy and I am sure, that you will change your mind. Maybe you will not accept his thesis, but anyway you will have a very broader conscious about what I have coment and about what you are writing. 


 Ordered the book !  .. I studied him 25 years ago but don't have a fair enough recall so I think it will do me good

 -3- Nice, his history is a little bit interessant too, because he changed his mind completely from the first to second book. By the way, why have you study that?

By 1988 I had read most AI book in the public county library and needed more food for thought

PS: I have not read the technical part. 

 Hi Douglas, Your approach has some common with my one ( Can you provide more info about your development? Thanks Nick

  •   <emeraldgreen> dmiles I could weakly agree here, there are ideas that humans are biased to think about the world in terms of agents and stories.
  •   <emeraldgreen> Maybe this bias can be formalized/generalized and used to guide universal search
  •     i don't mean it narrates axiom-of-choice in DPLL but i suppose on a meta-level it could do that
  •     (i mean i am saying i am avoiding the DPLL trap)at useful, i agree
  •     i think the best texts iH2O are
  •   <iH2O> 1977 ????
  •   * benjoffe ( has joined #ai
  •     and 
  •     two more modern books about that 1977 theory
  •     which seems the only theory that i've ever seen that wasn't rubbish
  •     (and i been reading AI books now for over 30 years )
  • <iH2O> the 2nd is about the thought process, and the 3rd is fancy reasoning
  • <iH2O> in my view this does not address the pure and         hard problem of intelligence at all
  •  well i think the 2nd needs the first and then upgrade the 1st with the KR of the 3rd yes
  •  i think the first is the only author that ever addresses  thinking
  •   and intelligence .. if i only read the 3rd and didn't understand he secretly intends we use the 1st then it be rubbish to (which is why it appears so )
  •     or i should rephrase the 2nd is a detailed study of what it was like impl the 1st
  •     the 3rd is to train you to do a better job at re-coding the 1st & 2nd
  •     (since the author is afraid that he might not have time to recode the second properly)
  •     SPGU was the first AI book i ever say that explained intelligence
  •     Riesbeck of course does as well as Schank
  •     Silvan Tomkins created script theory as a further development of his affect theory, which regards human beings' emotional responses to stimuli as falling into categories called "affects": he noticed that the purely biological response of affect may be followed by awareness and by what we cognitively do in terms of acting on that affect so that more was needed to produce a complete explanation of what he called "human being theory".
  •     "To deal with inflexibility, smaller modules called memory organization packets (MOP) can be combined in a way that is appropriate for the situation."  <- i see that as Asher's work
  •     this "Script Theory" and the propensity for humans to like to repeat enjoyable patterns (scripts) and how we execute that into a mental narrative is what makes us think we exist
  •   I know I know. "Scripts sound inflexible."
  •   how we construct (what are they?) and maintain scripts (in what language?) are the big questions:
  •    schanks MTRANS and mueller's event calc seems far fetched and overly logical i know.. But don't we have to start somewhere?
  •   but they keyed in on how imitation is implemented 
  •   we can disagree with their impl all we want
  •   additionally (sadly?) all forms of successful AI trickery have been based on training script theory
  •    sadly usually by hand    (like alicebot, shrdlu)
  • ]   but how the trick works is the theory is solid
  •   i'll go as far to say that shrdlu doesn't have to be seen as trickery
  • ]   daydreamer is not trickery
  • r=
  •    (the second book i mention is the explanation of how that program works)
  •    those impls only show what your program looks like after it learns a script
  •    (which is pretty dazzling)
  •    (sorry to repeat .. we still need to learn how to write the program to write new scripts)
  •    once that is done i think we can have AGI
  •    as long as we have given it the right goals that is
  •    though i do believe we have to make the impl of such systems softer in that they need to kowtow into running thru narration
  •  (bend of backwards) by being forced to run thru narration (that is they must be constantly constructing an internal dialog that represents their focus)
  •     they only learn abstraction when they create useful fictions about how that internal dialog interacted with the scripts
  •     rephrased: this disharmonious problem (the fact the narration and the reality only are vaguely related) leads to learning to models that implement abstract thinking
  •     this is why humans do it
  •     (i mean the only reason we are capable of abstract thinking)
  •     otherwise why we would have ever needed to?
  •     how else could we we narrate ourselves back to harmonious thinking?
  •     aren't humans always in service to some kind of inner voice?
  •     had we created the concepts of logic as a pale attempt to create a new justification system in which we can talk about outloud?
  •     isn't it possible that all creatures are not just reacting to their environment but in fact thinking with some internal dialogue that to them makes sense?
  •     what would that dialog need to look like since it can recall pictures and sounds and emotions?
  •     is psychoanalysis an attempt to train new internal dialogs?
  •     can we (do we?) change the narrative in that dialog to see the world differently for moments and even sometimes to induce comforting emotions?
  •     dialog? (that takes two) with whom are we speaking to?
  •     is that why we have this notion we exist? maybe we don't actually exist, maybe the only thing that exists is whom we speak to?
  •     whatever it is we speak to (dialog with, argue) isn't that ourselves?
  •     when we speak to ourselves, should that follow rules that we consider important in order to claim clear thinking?
  •     these rules of "sounding right" are fine but also don't we have visual rules we use for picturing a consistent environment?
  •     that is when we visually imagine a situation do we impose physics that relicate the environment is some ways?
  •     can this picture language still work in a dialog-like manner?
  •     do we enjoy poetry or drums or music because the meter allows us to still feel the required dialog process and hear "sounds right" ?
  •     do we tell ourselves story scripts that justify what our environment is doing around us?
  •     if the story we are telling ourselves doesn't sound right or if it doesn't match the environment , what tools do we have to create harmony again?
  •     more story?
  •     since at best we can only create a barely adequate representation do we make up better and more fitting "words" ?
  •     can we use narration to gloss over these inadequacies by using excuse like things like "it just does that cuz it has its own reasons"?
  •     are we fine with that compartmentalization because it "sounds right"?
  •     the above questions i think we all can answer
  •     this is why i feel script theory can describe cognition, awareness and creativity
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  •     funny the path for that thinking machine above doesn't get us to a machine we can actually talk to emoticon_smile
  •     (i mean from the get go)
  •     but it clearly describes what humans are
  •     (i hope i did it some justice that is)
  •     has anyone ever heard of an alternate AI theory with the capability described?
  •     (capability tho i mention above is built in .. that is that it must generate an internal dialog it finds pleasing)
  •    (and it adapts that dialog to fit situations regardless of how much it has to lie to make itself thinking sound right)
  •     again, has anyone ever heard of an alternate theory?  (I have not)
  •    (and this cognitive theory was created in the 1960s.. and since then I haven't heard one)
  •    i haven't seen anyone bother to try to code it
  •    so i believe until someone attempts to code this theory, or can come up with an alternate theory we won't have AGI
  •     to implement this theory though i admit we need tools like the N-dimensional DB
  •    we might have also need the CycL programming language since writing something like that in C sounds like a bit of work
  •     i don't mean for writing the N-dim Asher db, i am talking about the how modules properly access that DB
  • [58]   and when the access or programmer screwed up we need to see CycL backtraces (CycL calls these Logical Proofs)
  •     cycorp i shit you not.. only started working on this 3 years ago
  •     three years ago the "dialog language"
  •     30 years of screwing off pretending the cyc kb was important
  •     it was for pushing the limits of the CycL programing system
  •     but not for the "dialog kb"
  •     meaning i see the 30 years to be utter avoidance of thinking about AI
  •     and even today they don't know that the "dialog kb" is for anything of than some game emoticon_smile 
  •   <Asher> dmiles - as far as psychoanalysis that's right on
  •   <Asher> and my work is certainly in relation to tomkins
  •     hrrm i started looking up tomkins and didn't realize before he was so into pavlovian training
  •     (which is fine .. i just didn't notice that he was an embodiment nut)
  •   <Asher> yea he is
  •   <Asher> he is explicitly trying to rid us of freud
  •   <Asher> by returning to the body
  •     *nod*
  •     i guess i mix in "The Tomkins Blueprint" with having to narrate ourselves thru that blueprint     (that narration gives us the ability to think ourselves vs reactions)
  •     certainly the body (and its visceral reactions and trainability) plays a huge role
  •    i mean i think of these affects as being sent into our stories.. that is we make up stories to explain why we are experiencing them
  •      this way we can tell our minds what is going on.. i think it requires we repair or maintain the affects  as we parent this spoiled little brat that ourselves are though some stories are meant to create drama like when we yell at our wife and dog
  •    that is the body and mind loves the intensity of the effects even the ones that sicken it and yet it survives anyways

 04:46] == logicmoo [181466f5@gateway/web/freenode/ip.] has joined ##idni

 <logicmoo> the entertainment value of most poetry is how much pattern or expectation can be broken without Observer rejection

 <logicmoo> like in Jazz improvisation.. of course the contract is to play the same 3 notes at the end of every bar

 <dmiles> hrrm Richard Bandler seems to be a good source in this line of thinking

 <Karov> logicmoo: humor too

 <Karov> and knowledge expansion - like drilling

 <dmiles> for sure.. drilling leverages that exact mechanism (I had not thought of that)

 <dmiles> or remembering "BBROYGBVGW"

 <dmiles> via "Bad Boys.."

 <dmiles> small post on mechanized human i am using at work:!searchin/ontolog-forum/humor%7Csort:relevance/ontolog-forum/SpYMguc9Msg/uG61qAEECAAJ

 <dmiles> humor*

 <dmiles> i guess that post is more about "laughter"

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 <Karov> 'cause this is exactly the inscribing/rejection boundary like a shockwave front, or ... phase boundary

 <Karov> like chaos/order one emoticon_wink

 <dmiles> inscribing rejection boundary

 <dmiles> oops that was supposed to be to google emoticon_tongue

 <dmiles> despite knowing what you meant, it would have been nice to find discussions using that terminology

 <Karov> I improvised it just now

 <Karov> inscribing in a sense to become part of the structure which the observer is

 <Karov> not just reflecting, or something like that because this puts the ';reflector' as non-participant component

 <Karov> like the 'observer' in the copenhagen joke qm 'interpretation'

 <Karov> poetry, art, humor definitely hit spots on such a 'boundary' ... which we 'consume' now, they are prefabricated but just to be 'inscribed'

 <Karov> consciousness as currency of mind

 <Karov> derived from 'currency' etymology of something which flows

 <Karov> i.e. internalization / inscription of states and changes-of-states as states

 <Karov> in that sense Tegmark and many others most probably are right

 <Karov> about time =consciousness equivalence

 <Karov> as objectivity of subjective experience of time

 <Karov> past is the memory state

 <Karov> memory state includes self-reflections of the memory states

 <Karov> and of states which are change of states

 <Karov> may be this is the 'blockchain' of mind = the narrative

 <Karov> we do not tell it ourselves we ARE the narrative

 <Karov> *rr

 <dmiles> indeed.. well said

 <Karov> the trouble is the minuscule resources we have

 <Karov> I feel I most probably am right, that means - this is direction of thought which most probably will discover big treasures ... but it will take me decades and decades

 <Karov> to consume and digest all the OLD knowledge which exists

 <Karov> as Ohad many times pointed out about the vast 3000+ yrs old huge body of maths vs the shallow bag of tricks used by the 70-ish yrs old cs field maestros emoticon_wink

 <Karov> in fact it is undoable by unaided human brain cause the 'food' grows faster than the digestive capabilities

 <Karov> capacity

 <Karov> Tau will be the engine to cover those spaces

 <Karov> i.e. incl. a introspective almost instant transport system emoticon_wink

 <dmiles> instance transport system?

 <dmiles> instant*

 <Karov> if we visualize the world as a planet of formal logic islands and continents scattered in an ocean of natural languages on top of a vast magma ocean of non-verbality

 <Karov> instant transport system which gives to the Narrator quicker than the faster possible narration speed access to all poss. ... places

 <Karov> this will be like if the 'narrative=narrator' 'phase boundary out of the sudden becomes enormous , not a tunnel rock face to slowly graze and built-into-self the debris but a wormhole to

 <Karov> almost all the 'litosphere'

 <Karov> emoticon_smile I felt it ... I just past the rejection boundary

 <Karov> not funny or aesthetic any more

 <dmiles> still relevant

05:18] <dmiles> just for fun, i did find someting on google (using your key words) about logic of scaling discussions <- second 1/2 of page 101

 <dmiles> a new theory of "visual cognition" i hope to get around to publishing soon is based on that fact that we tell our eyes what it needs to perceive (and not much more) .. our eye may or may not reject that notion
 <klip> I think feelings comes just from needs. you lack something => feel bad. you got satisfied => feel good. The list of human needs and feelings is limited emoticon_smile Reason over this should not be difficult.
 <dmiles> if it doesn't reject it, then we actually record our action of thinking we see "it" rather than our eye telling us what we saw
 <dmiles> this is why we can look at the ocean and have a realistic memory of seeing the ocean.. it was because the scene originated mentally and the eye only allowed us to feel confirmed in our seeing
 <dmiles> there is a special process we go thru whenever a new thing is to become part of a seeable domain
 <dmiles> that process is more dialogitory with ourselves.. we do it so often we take it for granted and immagine instead we are seeing things
 <dmiles> when really what we are doing is "talking ourselves" thru a series of clues
 <dmiles> admittedly there are some initial proto language we use to have this sort of "visual conversation"
 <dmiles> visual *conversation
 <dmiles> such as we have to do things like:   <klip> we tell the eyes the context
 <dmiles> for example we don't see things that make no sense
 <dmiles> until we look again to see if maybe something else makes sense to be seen despite it is out of context
 <dmiles> what we are left with after this in not nerves in our brain programmed from the eye.. iut is programmed from that "please make it make sense" dialog we have using "visual conversation"
 <dmiles> now here is going to be the hardest pill to swallow of my theory...
 <dmiles> all critters do this!
 <dmiles> if you have say a spider.. it is really going of a set of expectations
 <dmiles> expectations of the domain its eyes would behold
 <dmiles> this "please make it make sense" "visual conversation" isn't necessarily elaborate as a canines
 <dmiles> but it is there nonetheless
 <dmiles> why i can feel comfortable imbuing spiders with that kind of intellect is it is not such a far reach as it might be to have enough intelect to run away from danger or build a web
 <dmiles> it is barely intellect even at all to have a "visual conversation"
 <dmiles> the only thing in history that humans almost figured that they being doing all along was the silly sounding idea that the eyes used to shoot out photons for us to see
 <dmiles> that is that we "projected" some notion outbound from the brain
 <dmiles> what this theory says is we record what we forecast the eyes to see
 <dmiles> the eyes have an attorney that argues against us and talks us into seeing what is really there
 <dmiles> but we still only remember what we forecast
 <dmiles> but we still only remember what we forecast and dont have shot down by the eye
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 <dmiles> as we'd not survive for very long (evolutionarily) had we remembered what was shot down
 <dmiles> as an example of this . if you see a dog running on the other side of a picket fence that always *occludes* 50% of the dog.. you will always see the whole dog.. (not 50%)
 <klip> I guess it is similar that we understand often what we expected to hear.
 <dmiles> (yet of course physically it would be impossible for you to see what you see)
 <dmiles> and will turn what we heard in too often what we understood
 <dmiles> and when we cant it is a decision to not understand it
 <dmiles> and when we cant it is really the result of a decided "i don't understand it"01:41] <dmiles> i see that bees are born knowing how to converse
[01:41] <dmiles> that is when they watch another bee dance they can tell the other be is resetting and starting the dance over
[01:42] <dmiles> 70% of the time the other bee is making syntaxical signals.. vs 30% of the time is content
[01:43] <dmiles> there is no pre training that took place to gain the ability to skillfully be on either side of that conversation
[01:43] <klip> so they just fit in? like they see the bigger picture? emoticon_smile
[01:44] <dmiles> it would not be too hard to imagine the eye brain interface of the bee having even the same skill level.. its eye just fits in with its brain
[01:45] <dmiles> wouldn't it be odd if all intelligence fits along this single model?
[01:46] <dmiles> evidenced by almost all beasts and subparts of all beasts are born with it
[01:47] <dmiles> humans would be born with it to if our months bodies could handle us growing to a year old
[01:47] <dmiles> humans would be born with it to if our mother bodies could handle us growing to a few months older.. like if our heads were shaped like other mammals like deer
[01:48] <dmiles> we'd be born with full eye language 
[01:48] * mathmatrix (~androirc@ has joined ##idni
[01:49] <dmiles> and other languages would have grown to the maturity that we might babble
[01:49] <dmiles> and remember seeing more things
[01:48] <dmiles> we'd be born with full eye language 
[01:48] * mathmatrix (~androirc@ has joined ##idni
[01:49] <dmiles> and other languages would have grown to the maturity that we might babble
[01:49] <dmiles> and remember seeing more things
[01:50] <dmiles> what is more interesting though is that fact that this "conversational intelligence" exists in every part of every animal brain
[01:50] <dmiles> down to "i have  an itch"
[01:51] <dmiles> i mean that is how nerves can be so absolutely exact
[01:51] <dmiles> even though their interface to the brain is so simplistic
[01:52] <dmiles> and these nerves are not even very exact.. they can tell us about witches that are over an inch away from themselves
[01:52] <dmiles> and these nerves are not even very exact..*yet* they can tell us about witches that are over an inch away from themselves
[01:53] <dmiles> they listen to unrelated nerves rejecting information
[01:53] <dmiles> of course that is our brain and not the nerves
[01:54] <dmiles> but it feels irregardless as "senses" 

Narrative Without Inscription

Most humans who have lived have been illiterate. They/we still told stories, a very small sample of which have been fossilized for observation today. These transcriptions and translations have kept the shape of those spoken specimens, but some of the connective tissue is missing- let alone the ecosystem that gave them the form that they had at fossilization.

Fossilized specimens are not alive. Beowulf the text is an instantiation of a Beowulf story that was told by memory, mnemonics, formula, personal style, and audience feedback- a living story that evolved and adapted across tellings, possibly highly variant like the weather but with some common salient features that drifted much more slowly, like climate.

In a recent re-reading of the Iliad that I rediscovered that the Trojan Horse wasn’t in the Iliad at all! The poem ends before the war ends- instead, the pseudo-sequel transcription of The Odyssey feeds that to us as mid-story flashback. One could imagine in a later Iliad retelling, maybe not long before or after the version we got, Homer actually went a bit further in his Iliad retelling and did indeed tell his audience about the Trojan Horse within the frame of A Poem About Ilium. It wasn’t a well-defined Intellectual Property- Homer didn’t own the story, and the boundaries of the story were probably often in flux.

The author of Before Literature: Narrative without the written word is interested in the study of Preliterature in order to pull us out of the water that we all swim in- the literate culture we presumably share, since you’re reading this. There are innumerate preliterate cultures with their unique stories, but there are common cheap tricks and forced moves that we ought to expect in the oral form, and this is the focus of her book.

Common Features of Pre-lit Epics

In his recent Mark Twain Award acceptance speech, Dave Chapelle talks about his mother’s suggestion that he should be a ‘griot’ [sic] (see 5:00-5:45)

Human brains are extremely lossy and have limited bandwidth, so the challenges of what to pass down and how to pass it down must be significant. Some of the considerations I’m about to list, especially the first few, are obvious, but some of them I think are under-considered when we think about why these stories are shaped the way they are.

  • Time: History is not yet considered as an itemized list of events causing one another, because there are no tools to reliably impose this chronosense. There are clear patterns they/we have long recognized- infancy to adulthood, or seasons that cycle in years that might actually be countable- but events in the oral mythology don’t occur at a particular time necessarily. They’re instead “once upon a time”, and often the story starts en medias res. The Iliad as we’ve fossilized it begins nine years into the Trojan War already, and bounces back and forth in time- as flashbacks or as fated future outcomes- as information becomes pertinent.
  • No surprises and subversion: The intended audience knows the broad outcomes of the story while it’s still being told anyway, as they’ve heard it before (because otherwise, how does the story survive?). Even within the story itself, Hector and Achilles have been informed they will die. The Illiad ends before Achilles himself actually dies, but we know that he will with certainty anyway. Surprising the audience or subverting expectations is not a reliable mechanic when stories have to be told and retold in order to be maintained, anyway.
  • Collective Ownership: Stories are not private events or private property. The words pass through the air and are gone, so of course telling a story always involves a speaker and one or more listeners. History is explicitly a social thing, Our Story, tied the audience of the oral history, their ancestors and homeland. There is some personal craft but the story is not a personal meditation and can’t be maintained as one.
  • Anchored to the Audience: There are long lists of Related Links and genealogies. These lists are social and political- who is related, where are they from, these are the parts we often glaze over as modern readers but to the intended audience this is live and relevant content that has to do with them. I remember the fan service applause in the Raimi Spiderman films whenever there was some hackneyed “This is New Yawk” moments. Peter Parker is from Queens, I know where that is and what it looks and feels like. I am from Queens (sort of- I’m a traveling tradesman who can’t be trusted, not rooted Queens volk)- Spiderman is my guy. (DC comics don’t do this as well, Metropolis and Gotham are just backdrops). The point being that to this audience, these are our Gods and heroes, our history.
  • Call and response: In live form, the Orator is often not the only contributor to the auditory landscape. The story is not a broadcast.
  • Episodic: “and then […] and then […].” Freytag triangles don’t exist here. Instead, like a Transformers movie, there is constant movement, constant fan service of one kind or another, if it’s identity-based cameos or lurid, excessive violence or slapstick comedy or intense bathos.
  • Repetition is an obvious technique for increasing the longevity of certain ideas or images. If I had a dollar for every invocation of Rosy-fingered Dawn or the Wine Dark Sea.
  • Exaggerated and clear characterization, often with excess praise or admonition involved. Subtle characterization will not survive the gap between tellings across generations.
  • The bathos thing, again for emphasis. Despite constantly having the same titles and prefixes assigned to them, characters moods and behaviors swing wildly in a telenovela/soap opera style. It’s more memorable, less subtle, more immediately grokkable, and easier to transmit.
  • Spectacular gruesomeness, because that shit sells. Obviously war stories are going to delight in this, but even non-war violence is often so wild that you could imagine the audience making oohs or maybe even laughing at the absurdity of it.
  • Stories are nested and compressed across time. Stories contain meta moments for characters to tell pertinent stories and histories to other characters. Some stories probably survive exclusively as hangers-on of more viral stories in the epic universe. Oral epics will often have long asides, or sudden flashbacks. Some cultures use physical story aides of mnemonics to keep the key details in check, but otherwise one could imagine the orders and inclusions for be a bit different in each telling. You could imagine some of the strange diversions and references in old stories as being vestigial, or possible nodes to deviate on in other popular stories or tellings of the same story. I could imagine that this is what happened in the Book of Genesis as it was fossilized, when we’re told of a time where “The Nephilim were in the earth in those days” without any further explanation. The Nephilim cameo, I assume naively, must have been meaningful to the audiences of the Jewish Extended Universe at the time.
  • Embodied objects: It’s an opportunity to transmit values or histories through special tools, weapons, or other items. This is probably more obvious in a world of scarcity where the provenance of things is more likely to be a concern to the audience anyway. In the Iliad, Hephaestus’ shield has a whole cosmology etched into it. A necklace gifted to Beowulf has a history that appears to connect it to other totems.
  • No subtlety- not in the stuff that would survive, anyway. Symbolism and word choice is formulaic for a reason- the specific word choice will not necessarily survive the great cultural form of telephone, and after spoken they only exist in partial form across a few distributed brains, and so close readings are not going to be encouraged.

Some resulting common themes I want to emphasize:

  • Formula: The idea of a work being formulaic is used pejoratively- Thomas Carlyle defined a formula with a “rule slavishly followed but not understood”, but contemporary medieval musician Benjamin Bagby argues that our real slavishness is our commitment to the written word- treating Beowulf (which he performs) as a single inelastic text. Without the crutch of literacy, how else to juggle such an immense poem, and flex it to appeal to each particular audience?
  • Intersubjectivity: In the oral tradition the audience’s role is more prominent than our modern auteur-centered media life generally allows for. The audience’s history, tastes, and shared totems provide easy rewards for a storyteller to tap into. We could imagine stories shifting over time to piggyback on contemporary political and social biases. Contemporary oral cultures will twist genealogies in ways that are disputable to written records.
  • Exteriority: Despite their frequent explicit characterizations, characters in the story are driven from external circumstances and social relations. Emotion here is not evidence of private feelings, but reflections of social relations. Shame, not guilt, is the overriding dread of the hero. Honor is likewise social. Grieving heroes are ABSOLUTE BABIES who rub themselves in dirt, tear at their hair, defiling themselves. A literal interpretation of this exteriority is the foundation of that Julian Jaynes thesis about consciousness itself (introspection etc.) being a very recent phenomenon.
  • Totems, not symbols: Symbolism is an exercise for the reader. Totems, by contrast, are pre-known to their audience. Clear metonymies and culturally significant icons- we could use as our own totems stuff like the Cross, the White House, the Military Uniform, the Swastika, or visual attributes of the Catholic Saints.

What’s next

As I get to it, muses permitting, I want to re-apply these notes to the concerns I will bring up in the immediate next post. I’d like to read more on them to present them as notes rather than random musings but there’s a shape of things that I think are interesting.

  • Traces of Oral Culture in Visual Media
  • Values in the Visual/Literature World that differ from values in the Auditory/Oral World
  • Airpods
  • Google Translate and the polyglot internet
  • Salient differences in new epics vs the old stuff
  • The anti-psychological plots of the oral world vs whatever we have now
  • Were people in the recent past better at talking than educated people are today?




Consciousness according to Julian Jaynes

(Click here to download the PDF version of the above)

Below is my personal memo from

Julian Jaynes'

The Origin of Consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind.

(1976/1990, Houghton Mifflin Company)



Denotative definition: what is introspectable, as it was for Descartes, Locke, and Hume. (p. 450)

Connotative definition: an analogy 'I' narratizing in a functional mind-space. (p. 450)

What consciousness is NOT: reactivity or perception.

What consciousness may NOT be involved in: hosts of perceptual phenomena; performance of skills; speaking, writing, listening or reading; learning;creative reasoning. (pp. 46-47, 447-449)


2.1 General Theory of Metaphor (See Note 1)

"The most fascinating property of language is its capacity to make metaphors." (p. 48)

"The lexicon of language, then, is a finite set of terms that by metaphor is able to stretch out over an infinite set of circumstances, even to creating new circumstances thereby. " (p. 52)

With language, when you want to express something that was inexpressible, you use a metaphier, a known word, to express the inexpressible.

The metaphier creates a metaphrand, a new entity that used to be the inexpressible. (METAPHIER -> METAPHRAND)

The metaphier has paraphiers, associations or attributes of the metaphier. (METAPHIER/PARAPHIERS)

The paraphiers create paraphrands, new associations or attributes the metaphrand obtains. (PARAPHIERS -> PARAPHRANDS)

The metaphier/paraphiers creates a new entitiy with new associations or attributes, the metaphrand/paraphrands. (METAPHIER/PARAPHIERS -> METAPHRAND/PARAPHRANDS)

2.2 Creation or invention of consciousness

The inexpressible: the mind

-> Metaphier: "I see [the new idea]!"

=> Metaphrand "The analog I sees [the new idea]."

-> Paraphier 1:

=> Paraphrand 1: The analog 'I' has the analog space.

-> Praphier 2:

=> Paraphrand 2: "Ideas are objects in the analog space."

=> Metaphrand/Praraphrand: The analog 'I' handling some objects in the analog space (or the mind-space). [Creation or invention of consciousness]

=>Consciousness is often assumed to behave just like I, the physical body, behave in the physical space.

=>If new ideas are objects in the mind-space, future actions or decisions can also be objects in the mind-space and the analog I can handle them in the mind-space.


"Subjective conscious mind is an analog of what is called the real world. It is built up with a vocabulary of lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogs of behavior in the physical world. Its reality is of the same order as mathematics. It allows us to shortcut behavioral processes and arrive at more adequate decisions. Like mathematics, it is an operator rather than a thing or repository. And it is intimately bound up with volition and decision. " (p. 55)

"[With consciousness], humans can ' look' into an imagined future with all its potential of terror, joy, hope, or ambition, just as if it were already real, and into a past moody with what might have been, or savoring what did, the past emerging through the metaphier of a space through whose long shadows we may move in a new and magical process called remembrance or reminiscence." (pp. 456-457)

"Along this new lifetime, putting together similar occurrences or excerpts of them -- inferences from what others tell us we are and from what we can tell ourselves on the basis of our own consciousness of what we have done -- we come to construct or invent, on a continuing basis, in ourselves and in others, a self. the advantage of an idea of your self is to help you know what you can or can't do or should or should not do." (pp. 457-458)

4.1 SpatializationConsciousness works within mind-space. Consciousness even spatialize time. (p. 60)

4.2 Excerption

"We are never conscious of things in their true nature, only of the excerpts we make of them." (p. 61)

4.3 The Analog 'I'

"[The analog 'I']can 'move about' vicarially in our 'imagination', 'doing' things that we are not actually doing." (pp. 62-63)

4.4 Metaphor 'Me'The analog 'I' sees a metaphor me. (See Supplement)

4.4.1 Analog 'I', Metaphor 'Me' and 'Self'Is the 'Self' the complex of the Analog 'I' and the Metaphor 'Me'? I'm not sure.

4.4.2 The ontology of the Analog 'I'The analog 'I' is the limit of the consciousness? (I'm not sure). See 5.6 of Tractatus by Wittgenstein (See Note)

4.4.3 The ontology of the Metaphor 'Me'The metaphor 'me' is an object in consciousness, probably the most important object.

4.5 Narratization

"In consciousness, we are always seeing our vicarial selves as the main figures in the stories of our lives." (p. 63)

"New situations are selectively perceived as part of this ongoing story, perceptions that do not fit into it being unnoticed or at least unremembered. More important, situations are chosen which are congruent to this ongoing story, until the picture I have of myself in my life story determines how I am to act and choose in novel situations as they arise. " (p. 64)

"The assigning of causes to our behavior or saying why we did a particular thing is all a part of narratization. Such causes as reasons may be true or false, neutral or ideal. " (p. 64)

"But it is not just our own analog 'I' that we are narratizing ; it is everything else in consciousness. A stray fact is narratized to fit with some other stray fact. A child cries in the street and we narratize the event into a mental picture of a lost child and a parent searching for it. A cat is up in a tree and we narratize the event into a picture of a dog chasing it there. Or the facts of mind as we can understand them into a theory of consciousness. " (p. 64)

4.6 Conciliation (or compatibilization, consillience)

"In conciliation, we are making excerpts or narratizations compatible with each other, just as in external perception the new stimulus and the internal conception are made to agree. " (p. 65)

5 Consciousness according to Julian Jaynes, as I understood itThe mind-space that the analog 'I' observes, in which the metaphor 'me' and other important mental objects behave with some the mental objects according to a story that emerges. (I'm not sure.)


Note to 2.1 General Theory of Metaphor: Read (again) the following books.

Metaphors We Live By

Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things

Philosophy in the Flesh : The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought
Available in Questia)

Note to 4.4.2 The ontology of the Analog 'I'

Propositions in 5.6 in Tractatus by Wittgenstein are as follows:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not.

For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.

What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.

This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth.
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself.

That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.

I am the world. (The microcosm.)

The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.
If I wrote a book The world as I found it, I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.

The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world

Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye.

And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

5.6331 From the form of the visual field is surely not like this. [Figure omitted. To see the figure, see the version that contains German, and Ogden and Pears & McGuinness translations]

This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.

Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.

There is no order of things a priori.

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world".

The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit -- not a part of the world.

The above translation was obtained from Hypertext of the Ogden bilingual edition

The version that contains German, and Ogden and Pears & McGuinness translations Side-by-Side-by-Side



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Emergence of the individual mind-set?

Quotation from

Good Grief: Is there a better way to be bereaved?

By Meghan O'Rourke

The New Yorker, February 1, 2010, p. 71.

With the rise of psychoanalysis came a shift in attention from the communal to the individual experience. Only two years after Emile Durkheim wrote about mourning as an essential social process, Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" Defined it as something fundamentally private and individual. In a stroke, the work of mourning had bceome internalized. As Aries says, withing a few generations grief had undergone a fundamental change: death and mourning had been largely removed from the public realm.



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Stop arguing about words

Quotation from

Silent Quantum Genius

by Freeman Dyson

The New York Review of Books, February 25, 2010, p. 23.

About Paul Dirac, who lead the second revolution in physics in the 20 th century, quantum mechanics.

He [=Paul Dirac] said, as Galileo said three hundred years earlier,that mathematics is the language that nature speaks. When expressed in mathematical equations,the laws of quantum mechanics are clear and unambiguous. Confusion arises from misguided attempts to translate the laws from mathematics to human language.

Human language describes the world of everyday life,and lacks the concepts that could describe quantum processes accurately. Dirac said we should stop arguing about words,stay with mathematics, and allow the philosophical fog to blow away. I consider Dirac's disengagement from verbal disputes about the meaning of quantum mechanics to be an essential part of his legacy. But I am,as usual,in the minority.



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Time is the new dimension

Quotation from


By David Gelernter

With tremendous search engines and massive storage on the Cloud, space is no longer a problem . We no longer need cabinets, bookshelves or libraries that occupy physical space.

The scarce resource now is time. Instead of wondering how we place information in space, the old scarce resource, we now wonder how we organize time.

After all, we're mortal.

23. The Internet's future is not Web 2.0 or 200.0 but the post-Web, where time instead of space is the organizing principle -- instead of many stained-glass windows, instead of information laid out in space, like vegetables at a market -- the Net will be many streams of information flowing through time.

However, the current web culture consumes our scarce resource with immense information about 'now.' (I hardly understand why people enjoy twittering. For me, it is filling up your life with garbage.)

29. Nowness is one of the most important cultural phenomena of the modern age: the western world's attention shifted gradually from the deep but narrow domain of one family or village and its history to the (broader but shallower) domains of the larger community, the nation, the world. The cult of celebrity, the importance of opinion polls, the decline in the teaching and learning of history, the uniformity of opinions and attitudes in academia and other educated elites -- they are all part of one phenomenon.

However, no instrument is bad (or good) in itself; we can use it wisely.

31. But -- the Internet could be the most powerful device ever invented for understanding the past, and the texture of time. Once we understand the inherent bias in an instrument, we can correct it. The Internet has a large bias in favor of now. Using lifestreams (which arrange information in time instead of space), historians can assemble, argue about and gradually refine timelines of historical fact.

As well as the prejudice for nowness, the current web culture has the prejudice for our own prejudice. The Internet enhances our prejudice enormously in many people.

But again, we can use the Internet wisely, that is, we may stop our bounded rationality limit our potentiality.

34. The Internet today is, after all, a machine for reinforcing our prejudices. The wider the selection of information, the more finicky we can be about choosing just what we like and ignoring the rest. On the Net we have the satisfaction of reading only opinions we already agree with, only facts (or alleged facts) we already know. You might read ten stories about ten different topics in a traditional newspaper; on the net, many people spend that same amount of time reading ten stories about the same topic. But again, once we understand the inherent bias in an instrument, we can correct it. One of the hardest, most fascinating problems of this cyber-century is how to add "drift" to the net, so that your view sometimes wanders (as your mind wanders when you're tired) into places you hadn't planned to go. Touching the machine brings the original topic back. We need help overcoming rationality sometimes, and allowing our thoughts to wander and metamorphose as they do in sleep.



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FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 2010

Economics = Poetry + Mathematics?

Quotation from

THE DEFLATIONSIT: How Paul Krugman found politics

by Larissa MacFarquhar

The New Yorker, March 1, 2010, pp. 38-49.

"Economic geography" is about regional specialties. It explains why a particular region gained a comparative advantage with a particular product and benefits from economies of scale-- by history and accident.

"I explained this basic idea" --of economic geography-- "to a non-economist friend," Krugman wrote, "who replied in some dismay, 'Isn't that pretty obvious?' And of course it is." Yet, because it had not been well modelled, the idea had been disregarded by economists for years. Krugman began to realize that in the previous few decades economic knowledge that had not been translated into models had effectively lost, because economists didn't know what to do with it. (p. 45)

Krugman is superb at deciding what to explain and what not to:

He [=Krugman] could take an intriguing notion that had come up in real-world discussions, pare away the details (knowing just what to take out and what was essential), and refine what was left into a clean, clever, "cute" (as he liked to put it), and simple model. "It's poetry," Kenneth Rogoff, an economist at Harvard says. (p. 45)

Economic models often explains some aspect of really really beautifully at the price of neglecting more important aspect.

"I think there's a pretty good case to be made that the stuff that I stressed in the models is a less important story than the things that I left out because I couldn't model them, like spillovers of information and social networks," he says. But failure to represent reality accurately is rarely a fatal flaw in an economics model -- what's valued is the model's usefulness as an analytic tool. (p. 45)

Sometimes we choose to be ignorant to look smart.



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science of socially shared stories

Quotation from

HEAD CASE: Can psychiatry be a science

by Louis Menand

The New Yorker, March 1, 2010, pp. 68-74.

In this article, Louis Menand, a professor of English at Harvard, reviews The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant Myth by Irving Kirsch, a professor of psychology at the University of Hull, United Kingdom, and professor emeritus at the University of Connecticut in the United States.

Kirsch, according to Menand, concludes from his meta-analyses of antidepressant drug trials that antidepressants are just fancy placebos. But, then, how come that each drug had statistically significant superiority over the placebo when it was approved in the drug trial?

Kirsh argues that despite the scheme of double-blind tests, the patients (who are paid) can assume whether they're taking the drug or not by detecting in them side effects such as nausea, restlessness, dry mouth, and so on, which the placebo does not cause. Menand summarizes Kirsch's argument:

This means that a patient who experiences minor side effects can conclude that he is taking the drug, and start to feel better, and a patient who doesn't experience side effects can conclude that she's taking the placebo, and feel worse. On Kirsch's calculation, the placebo effect ― you believe that you are taking a pill that will make you feel better; therefore, you feel better ― wipes out the statistical difference. (p. 70)

The placebo effect is an established fact in experiments.

He [=Kirsch] cites a 1957 study at the University of Oklahoma in which subjects were given a drug that induced nausea and vomiting, and then another drug, which they were told prevents nausea and vomiting. After the first anti-nausea drug, the subjects were switched to a different anti-nausea drug, then a third, and so on. By the sixth switch, a hundred percent of the subjects reported that they no longer felt nauseous ― even though every one of the anti-nausea drugs was a placebo. (pp. 70-71)

It seems to me that science of the placebo is more important than science of developing new drugs, if your drive is science, not profit.

Menand reports that the effects of different treatments are only mixed:

Later studies have shown that patients suffering from depression and anxiety do equally well when treated by psychoanalysts and by behavioral therapists; that there is no difference in effectiveness between C.B.T. [=cognitive-behavioral therapy], which focuses on the way patients reason, and interpersonal therapy, which focuses on their relations with other people; and that patients who are treated by psychotherapists do no better than patients who meet with sympathetic professors with no psychiatric training. Depressed patients in psychotherapy do no better or worse than depressed patients on medication. There is little evidence to support the assumption that supplementing antidepressant medication with talk therapy improve outcomes. What a load of evidence does seem to suggest is that care works for some of the people some of the time, and it doesn't much matter what sort of care it is. Patients believe that they are being cared for by someone who will make them feel better; therefore, they feel better. It makes no difference whether they're lying on a couch interpreting dreams or sitting in a Starbucks discussing the concept of "flow." (p. 71)

Is this then, science of care, rather than science of the placebo, that should be explored? Or is it science of social expectation?

A narrative becomes a story when it matches social expectation; when it is socially (and/or culturally) accepted and shared. What we may need may be science of socially shared stories.



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I'm (Mr./Dr.) Yosuke YANASE, Professor at the Institute for Liberal Arts and Sciences (ILAS) in Kyoto University. I teach English as a practitioner-researcher.



Second Self

The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit by Sherry TurkleISBN 0671468480 Out of Print Limited Availability -- Turkle watched MIT students dive into computer programming from the vantage point of the Sociology department. What struck her was that such otherwise bright students found no more powerful metaphor for themselves than that of machine. Abstract arguments aside, she found this really sad.

I'm not sure why it should be sad (said the programmer). A metaphor is a context for thought and understanding which has relevant similarities to a target conceptual domain. A "good" metaphor is easily understandable to the thinker and has similarities to the target domain which are relevant to some pertinent task.Thus, a metaphor is good (or bad) only within the context of a particular task. Perhaps the power of the metaphor is the range of tasks that it's good for. In any case, a programmer's mind can think of just about anything as a universal simulation that we all happen to be a part of. That done, the idea of "machine" suddenly becomes arbitrarily relevant to any situation. Therefore, "Machine" is as powerful a metaphor as ever needed for any task, so long as you get to define the specs of the machine.Obviously, many metaphor/task pairs require fewer levels of indirection than those involving machines. Indirection is a thought process that strong programmers have no problem with, while it confounds many others. Art is indirection, but you can't convince an artist of it. Physics and math are really two sides of the same coin, but you can't convince either of it.There is much in mathematics that is not a metaphor for any task in physics...

I agree with the programmer commenting above - it's a telling point on authorial bias that the sociologist fells it's sad that programmers use a machine metaphor for the mind - it shows that the author a) does not understand the metaphor, b) injects her own (common) opinion of machines as simplistic clockwork devices, and c) ignores the great mass of evidence that people usually behave in simple patterns that are perhaps less complex than most everyday machines. Even the opponents of strong AI concede that it will be possible soon to have machines that will mimic human behavior to a great degree, simply through brute-force methods.

I strongly agree with the sociologist. Metaphors are not just composed of metaphiers and metaphrands (respectively, the machine and the mind in the example above). They're also composed of paraphiers and paraphrands. Things which are beside, associated with and implied by, the metaphor.In the machine metaphor, some of the paraphiers are 'no emotions', 'no feelings', and 'no rights'. That is, machines have no emotions, feelings nor rights so by analogy, humans have none of those things. Or at the least, these things are of absolutely no concern to us. To say that a human being (or the mind) is like a machine is to debase it, to strip it of everything that makes it valuable and human. To think of oneself that way is extremely sad.To recap my points: I feel that Turkle is injecting her own opinions into the book, making it less a study than an editorial; if strong AI is possible, then minds can be machines, and so the metaphor is sufficiently powerful to be useful and acceptable; and Turkle seems to favor a non-reductionist stance, where consciousness is somehow not a natural property of a sufficiently complex system. [the brain]And in fact, it isn't. Consciousness is not a natural property of the brain. If it were then simple disorders like schizophrenia wouldn't cause the diminution and annihilation of consciousness. Nor would common phenomena like hypnosis fundamentally alter or suppress consciousness. Then there are the somnanbulist states. And then there's the fact that it takes a lot of extremely complex behaviour on the part of parents in order to raise children with consciousness. To believe that "consciousness is a natural property of a sufficiently complex brain" requires one to be ignorant of both consciousness and the brain.And again, does the above author mean any complex system or specifically the brain?? If it's only the brain then why leave the original words, with their provably absurd meaning, intact while removing the proof that their meaning is absurd?People should understand what consciousness is before fighting over it and why consciousness is central to the mind before dragging in people's unconscious behaviours.In TheOriginOfConsciousnessInTheBreakdownOfTheBicameralMind, JulianJaynes spends an entire chapter providing an excellent breakdown of what consciousness is not. It's not experience, it's not behaviour, it's not reason, and it's not even thought. All these things are necessary for consciousness but none are sufficient. He then spends another entire chapter describing what consciousness is, and then lastly proposes the "consciousness is metaphor" definition of consciousness.

This page is the inverse of the statement: "Don't anthropomorphize computers. They hate that."

In order to decide whether Turkle is right that machine is a weak metaphor for person, you'd have to look at her actual cases. I think most of them aren't programmers, and of the programmers, many did indeed have "mechanistic" pictures of machines and by analogy people.On the other hand, it's my recollection that Turkle didn't understand the metaphor well enough, and stood too far outside it, as if it were a clear cut pathology like the boy who decorated his room with gears and talked in a monotone.Exactly my point. Thank you.You know the Zen saying, before zen, trees are trees, mountains are mountains. Newcomer to Zen, trees are the Buddha, mountains are fluctuations of mind, rainbows, etc. After enlightenment, trees are trees, mountains are mountains. (Abbreviated in that 1960s song: "first there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.")Same for the word machine. When you've gotten to the point that absolutely everything could be a simulation inside a computer, you're halfway. Then I recommend the koan, "Machine compared to what?" At that point the meaning comes back: simplistic, repetitious, but easily understood, or controlled, stuff like that.Also, to the extent that there are lots of important and interesting phenomena that we don't know how to simulate (intelligence being one!), machine is a bad analogy for person because we don't know how to draw the analogy! In that sense programmability can be a siren call: in principle you could understand anything in terms of a computer metaphor, but in practice you run against the rock when actually trying leads nowhere. But I could! Smack! But I could! Smack!... Futilly retrying things that ought to work is one definition of neurosis. Sometimes sticking to one viewpoint is a way of avoiding understanding. --SteveWithamAgreed. But Turkle has not shown that the rest of humanity does not also use an equally ineffective metaphor - just that she does not like the one chosen by the people she interviewed.She doesn't need to. Most psychologists have a good understanding of what consciousness is already, so she wouldn't need to prove that a bad metaphor of consciousness is bad. Consciousness is the ability to make metaphors about one's behaviour. See JulianJaynes' book (which provides two solid chapters summarizing current research on consciousness).Are you referring to the book published in 1976? Who wrote the chapters on current research? From all that I've read, Jaynes is hardly accepted by the majority of psychologists as authoritative. And you haven't addressed the issue - Turkle does not show that the rest of humanity, or even college students, are not using an equally ineffective metaphor.She doesn't need to. Demonstrating that a position is incorrect, nonsensical or absurd doesn't necessitate providing an alternative. The argument is simply irrelevant and I dismiss it out of hand. But that's not even what Turkle is trying to say.Turkle is trying to say that the 'machine' metaphor is dehumanizing and harmful to human dignity. And so, proving that other people have a superior, less dehumanizing, conception of consciousness than as a 'machine' is trivial. Most people's conception of consciousness is as a little homunculus in their brain controlling actions. Now, that metaphor may be useless and circular but it's certainly not undignified.As for Jaynes' position in psychology, psychology is a very screwed up field. You know that's so when Freud is still respected but deMause is denigrated. Don't think that psychology is unique in this. Physics is as well, and even mathematics to a lesser extent. Then there's economics which is royally screwed up. So I'll pick my own authorities, thank you very much.Personally I like Dennett's metaphors - "Multiple Drafts" and "Center of Narrative Gravity" among them. He also makes good use of the "computer" metaphor, suitably restricted in scope - the "Serial Virtual Machine" transforming inherently parallel processes into what introspectively appears to be a continuous "stream" of consciousness.There's a good point in Dennett - of course serial computers are an apt metaphor for what we perceive our minds to be : serial computers were modeled after Turing's analysis of his own thought processes - and he reconstructed them as serial and goal-directed. But careful investigation shows that our minds cannot be operating in this fashion.There probably are metaphors of consciousness that do more for human dignity. I seem to recall Dennett touches on this point as well : it probably matters more that we "really" understand the human mind (which involves finding appropriate metaphors at all levels of explanation, as well as good, solid theoretical arguments and empirical investigations) than that we "sugarcoat" our knowledge of mind with false-to-fact metaphors that promote social responsibility or other desirable values.

This shows pretty well the basic premise in psychology: ThereIsOnlyOneRightAnswer, and only I know what it is.Anyway, what metaphor do you think is appropriate for a human being? Can you think of something that isn't as deterministic as a Windows box full of shareware?


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